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With the widespread use of computerized tests in educational measurement and
cognitive psychology, registration of response times has become feasible in many
applications. Considering these response times helps provide a more complete picture
of the performance and characteristics of persons beyond what is available based on
response accuracy alone. Statistical models such as the hierarchical model (van der
Linden, 2007) have been proposed that jointly model response time and accuracy.
However, these models make restrictive assumptions about the response processes
(RPs) that may not be realistic in practice, such as the assumption that the association
between response time and accuracy is fully explained by taking speed and ability into
account (conditional independence). Assuming conditional independence forces one to
ignore that many relevant individual differences may play a role in the RPs beyond overall
speed and ability. In this paper, we critically consider the assumption of conditional
independence and the important ways in which it may be violated in practice from a
substantive perspective.We consider both conditional dependences that may arise when
all persons attempt to solve the items in similar ways (homogeneous RPs) and those
that may be due to persons differing in fundamental ways in how they deal with the
items (heterogeneous processes). The paper provides an overview of what we can learn
from observed conditional dependences. We argue that explaining and modeling these
differences in the RPs is crucial to increase both the validity of measurement and our
understanding of the relevant RPs.
Keywords: conditional dependence, response processes, speed-accuracy trade-off, measurement, modeling
response times
1. INTRODUCTION
Using the statistical tools of for example item response theory (IRT; see e.g. Hambleton and
Swaminathan, 1985; van der Linden and Hambleton, 1997), responses to items from cognitive and
educational tests are used to make inferences about the underlying abilities. While standard IRT
models attempt to capture quantitative differences in measured ability, these models focus only on
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the correctness of the responses (i.e., response accuracy;
RA). When using these models, between- and within-person
differences in response processes (e.g., used solution strategies,
concentration, or operating speed) are taken to be noise and
are usually ignored in practice, despite possibly being relevant
for the assessment of persons. An important indicator of those
possible differences in response processes (RPs) is response time
(RT), which due to the increasing popularity of computerized
testing has become available in many applications of educational
and cognitive testing. Considering this additional information
provides a more complete picture of the RPs.
Within psychometrics effort has been devoted to developing
suitable jointmodels for RT and RA to incorporate this additional
source of information into the traditional measurement
procedures (e.g., Thissen, 1983; van der Linden, 2007; Molenaar
et al., 2015a,b). The hierarchical modeling framework (van der
Linden, 2007, 2009) presents a theoretically appealing approach
for making use of RT in ability measurement, and has arguably
become the dominant approach to modeling RA and RT in
educational measurement. It posits two measurement models:
one for RA, capturing a person’s effective ability (θ), and one for
RT, capturing a person’s effective speed (τ ). The two models are
linked at the population level, where both the speed and ability
of persons, and the difficulty and time intensity of items can be
correlated.
One of the central questions when it comes to modeling RT
and RA is about explaining the relationship between these two
outcome measures. The hierarchical model (HM) assumes the
association between RT and RA to be fully explained by the
correlation between the person characteristics and between the
item characteristics: it assumes conditional independence (CI)
of RA and RT given those person and item characteristics1.
This is graphically illustrated in Figure 1A. However, in real-
life applications there may be important residual associations
between RT and RA, indicating misfit of the HM. These
conditional dependences (CDs) might be relevant from a
substantive point of view since they shed light on the interesting
phenomena in RPs and possible between- and within-person
differences.
Recently, attention has been devoted to testing the CI
assumption (van der Linden and Glas, 2010; Bolsinova and
Maris, 2016; Bolsinova and Tijmstra, 2016) and joint models
for RT and RA have been extended to account for CD (Ranger
and Ortner, 2012; Meng et al., 2015; Bolsinova et al., 2016a,b;
Molenaar et al., 2016b), see Figures 1B–D. While different in
their approach to CD, these models share the feature that they
deal with the dependence in a descriptive way. That is, the
dependence is captured by the model, but not explained by it
(e.g., it is not explained why some items have positive CD and
some have negative CD, see Figures 1B,C, or what different
classes of responses represent, see Figure 1D). In this paper,
instead of taking a statistical point of view we are looking at CD
from a more substantive and explanatory perspective and discuss
1A similar mathematical property follows from Ratcliff ’s unbiased diffusion model
(1978), in which given the drift rate and boundary separation the choice made and
the time to make it are independent.
the different kinds of RP phenomena that may lead to CD. Taking
these phenomena into consideration (and ideally including them
in the statistical model if they are present) is important for two
reasons: (1) to improve the quality of the measurement of the
attributes of interest and (2) to try to learn about the cognitive
processes leading to the responses.
Including RT in measurement models forces one to focus on
aspects of RPs that without RT are convenient or at least easy
to ignore, that is, the possible confounding of measurement due
to differences in RPs. As will be elaborated in the subsequent
sections, these relevant differences in the RPs may be qualitative
in nature (i.e., heterogeneous RPs), but can also be present when
the RPs do not differ fundamentally (i.e., homogeneous RPs). In
this paper, we take a careful look at the substantive assumptions
about the RPs that are made by common joint models for RA
and RT, and explore the ways in which these assumptions may
be violated in practice. These assumptions are the following: (1)
there is no systematic within-person variation of speed and ability
across items; (2) item characteristics are constant across persons;
(3) responses come from the same process.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss how
CD can arise when assumptions 1 and 2 are violated in cases of
homogeneous RPs. In Section 3 we elaborate on heterogeneous
RPs (i.e., persons do different things when confronted with an
item), which entail a violation of assumption 3 and potentially
cause CD. The paper concludes with a discussion on what steps
one could take to distinguish the different possible phenomena
presented in this paper in practice.
2. HOMOGENEOUS RESPONSE
PROCESSES
Let us without loss of generality consider a simple specification of
theHMassuming CI with the one-parameter normal ogivemodel
for RA and the log-normal model for RT (van der Linden, 2006):
[
X∗pi
T∗pi
]
∼ N2
([
θp − βi
ξi − τp
]
,
[
1 0
0 σ 2i
])
, (1)
where X∗pi and T
∗
pi are the underlying continuous RA and the log-
transformed RT of person p on item i, respectively; and βi, ξi, and
σ 2i are the difficulty, the time intensity and the residual variance
of item i, respectively. X∗i and T
∗
i can be both represented as
the sum of their expected value and the normally distributed
residuals. A nonzero correlation between these two residuals
constitutes CD, while a zero correlation implies that CI holds.
The residual RT can be partly due to a fluctuation of τ (i.e.,
a person working relatively faster or slower on an item than on
the test as a whole) or a fluctuation of ξi (i.e., an item being
relatively more or less time intensive for a person than for the
average person). Analogously, part of the residual RA can be a
fluctuation of θ (i.e., persons performing above or below their
average performance on the test) or a fluctuation of βi (i.e., an
item being relatively more or less difficult for this particular
person compared to other persons). In the traditional HM these
fluctuations are taken to be noise and the fluctuations on the
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FIGURE 1 | Joint models for response time and accuracy: standard hierarchical model (A), existing descriptive models for conditional dependence (B–D), and
an example of an explanatory model for conditional dependence (E). θ and τ are speed and ability, X*
i
and T*
i
are continuous underlying response accuracy and
log-transformed response time of item i, ǫXi and ǫTi are the residuals, Ci is a latent class of a response to item i, and Z is a covariate (e.g., school type). In (A)
conditional independence given θ and τ is assumed. In (B) the correlation between the residuals of time and accuracy is added to the model (Ranger and Ortner,
2012; Meng et al., 2015). In (C) an effect of residual response time on response accuracy is modeled (Bolsinova et al., 2016a,b). In (D) different latent classes of
responses are considered which differ both in response time and accuracy (Molenaar et al., 2016b). In (E) possible conditional dependence between time and
accuracy given θ and τ is explained by an observed covariate Z.
RA and the RT sides are taken to be uncorrelated. However, in
practice θp and τp might co-vary across items, and βi and ξi might
co-vary across persons.
It may be noted that statistically speaking the variation of βi
and ξi across persons cannot be disentangled from the variation
of θ and τ of persons across items. They are the two sides of the
same person-by-item interaction. That is, instead of saying that
βi and ξi are higher for person p than expected, we might say
that θp and τp are lower than expected when responding to item
i. However, these two phenomena are conceptually different as
will be elaborated in the next subsections and it is important to
consider them separately when trying to understand RPs.
2.1. Variation of Speed and Ability of a
Person across Items
The within-person relationship between speed and accuracy has
been of primary interest for cognitive psychologists (Townsend
and Ashby, 1983; Luce, 1986). The phenomenon that RA
generally decreases as a person increases their speed (speed-
accuracy trade-off, SAT; for an overview see e.g., Heitz, 2014)
has been studied extensively and is well-established in a variety
of cognitive tasks, such as memory retrieval (Reed, 1973; Dosher,
1976), visual search (e.g., McElree and Carrasco, 1999; Carrasco
and McElree, 2001), and perceptual decision making (e.g.,
Kleinsorge, 2001; Wenzlaff et al., 2011). SAT is studied using
different experimental methods, such as varying deadlines or
varying the time when participant are given a signal to respond
(for an overview of methods, see e.g., Wickelgren, 1977).
While usually not intended by the test developers, persons
may still change their balance of speed and accuracy while taking
a test. This may be especially plausible in settings where a strict
total time limit is imposed, but could occur due to other factors as
well. Such unmodeled variation in the response caution (i.e., the
choice of speed-accuracy balance) within persons would result in
positive CD given θ and τ .
The speed-accuracy trade-off paradigm takes as its starting
point that persons have a constant amount of cognitive resources
(cognitive capacity) at their disposal, which can be used either
to work relatively fast but make many mistakes, or to work
more accurately but slowly. However, cognitive capacity may
also change throughout the test, for example if the level of
motivation or the level of concentration changes (e.g., due to
fatigue; Mollenkopf, 1950). In this case RT may decrease while
RA increases if both concentration and motivation increase, or
vice versa if both concentration and motivation decrease (i.e.,
negative CD). This relates to the person-specific variance of the
drift rate in the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978), which if present
also leads to negative CD.
To summarize, θ and τ may in practice vary across the
test due to variation of response caution, variation of cognitive
capacity, or both. Figure 2 shows two examples of this within-
person variation. Since cognitive capacity is positively related
to both speed and ability, while response caution is positively
related to ability and negatively to speed, on the left larger
variation of cognitive capacity results in a positive covariation
of effective speed and ability (i.e., negative CD) and on the
right larger variation of response caution results in a negative
covariation of speed and ability (i.e., positive CD). Response
caution and cognitive capacity might also co-vary which makes
the full picture of CD even more complex.
2.2. Variation of Difficulty and Time
Intensity across Persons
Standard models assume that an item has a constant difficulty
and time intensity for all persons, however it is possible that
an item’s difficulty varies across persons due to idiosyncratic
differences. Even persons with the same educational background
that are exposed to the same curriculum will have slightly
different learning trajectories (e.g., reading book chapters
in a different order when preparing for the test). Even
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FIGURE 2 | Hypothetical variation of response caution and cognitive capacity within a single person during a test: (A) The variation of cognitive capacity is
larger than the variation of response caution, resulting in a positive covariation between effective speed and ability (see the red axes rotated counterclockwise over
45◦) and negative conditional dependence between response time and accuracy given the average speed and ability; (B) The variation of response caution is larger
than the variation of cognitive capacity, resulting in a negative covariation between effective speed and ability (see the red axes rotated counterclockwise over 45◦) and
positive conditional dependence between response time and accuracy given the average speed and ability. Here, for simplicity we assume that response caution and
cognitive capacity vary independently within a person.
larger differences will exist between persons from different
educational backgrounds or subpopulations. This will result
in some items being relatively more difficult or easy for a
particular student compared to its difficulty for the rest of
the population. Additionally, if dimensions beyond the ability
of interest determine the probability of success (i.e., if there
is unmodeled multidimensionality), item difficulty will also be
different for persons differing on those additional dimensions.
Essentially, such variations in difficulty across persons can be
considered to constitute differential item functioning (DIF; see,
e.g. Mellenbergh, 1989).
In educational and cognitive tests positive correlation is often
found between β and ξ across items (e.g., van der Linden et al.,
1999; Klein Entink et al., 2009), so the same pattern can be
expected within an item: If a item is more difficult for a particular
person than expected (based on βi), it will also likely requiremore
time to complete (i.e., negative CD).
3. HETEROGENEOUS RESPONSE
PROCESSES
In the previous subsection we considered situations where
the same RP takes place for each person. For some items,
however, a response can be obtained in different ways (i.e.,
using heterogeneous RPs): The RT of person 1 might differ from
the RT of person 2 not because they do the same thing at a
different speed, but because they do different things (possibly
at the same speed). For example, the item “1400 − 797 = ?”
may be solved either using mental heuristic calculation or using
column subtraction on paper. If the different RPs differ both
in time intensity and probability of success, CD, either positive
or negative, will arise. Whether such differences in the RPs are
substantively interesting or should be considered irrelevant noise
will depend on the specific differences that are present and the
purpose of the test.
One substantively interesting way in which RPs can differ
is in the type of processing that a person uses. Here, it has
been suggested to distinguish fast processes taken to be relatively
automatic and heuristically driven and slow processes which
are more controlled and algorithmic (Partchev and De Boeck,
2012; Goldhammer et al., 2014; DiTrapani et al., 2016; Molenaar
et al., 2016a). These differences impact both expected RA and RT,
resulting in CD that can be positive or negative.
While differences between fundamentally different fast and
slow processes are an interesting subject to study for cognitive
psychology, other differences in RPs might be solely due to
test-taking conditions or particular item features, rather than
due to substantively interesting phenomena. This is for example
observed when fast random guessing takes place (Schnipke and
Scrams, 1997; Wang and Xu, 2015). For most items RA would be
higher for normal response behavior than for random guessing
(i.e., positive CD). However, if a multiple-choice item contains
strong distractors one might observe negative CD, since in that
case for low-ability students random guessing might actually be
more successful than normal responding.
An alternate form of guessing that may take place is ability-
based guessing (San Martín et al., 2006), which is both slower
than random guessing and has a higher probability of success. On
knowledge-based tests where persons are expected to recognize
the correct answer, ability-based guessing results in responses
that are both less likely to be correct and have taken more
time than responses provided by persons who recognize the
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correct response option (i.e., negative CD). This direction may
reverse for items that contain strong distractors that may trigger
incorrect fast responses, when recognition breaks down for many
respondents.
When both fast and slow guessing are expected to take place,
it is difficult to formulate expectations regarding the direction
and strength of CD. This also means that having observed
CD on a test where forms of guessing are plausible should
not too readily be taken as evidence that a more substantively
interesting differentiation between processes is needed to explain
the observed CD.
4. TOWARD EXPLANATORY MODELS
In this paper we have considered different phenomenawhichmay
all lead to CD. Our overview shows that there is muchmore to the
relationship between time and accuracy than can be studied using
traditional models assuming CI. Moreover, CD need not be seen
as a nuisance to elegant statistical models, but can be seen as a
window through which more can be learned about the cognitive
processes behind the responses and about individual differences,
which makes it highly relevant for psychological research as well
as educational testing.
To learn from observed CD one will need to disentangle the
possible sources of CD. This may not always be achievable if only
RT and RA are available, as different phenomena may result in
similar patterns of dependence. However, additional explanatory
variables (person, item, or response covariates) might help in
determining which particular phenomena are involved. The HM
can be extended to include the effects of these covariates on both
RT and RA, as illustrated in Figure 1E. Having effects of the
covariate on RA and RT that are in the same direction results in
positive CD, while effects of opposite directions result in negative
CD. To test whether CD observed under theHMcan be explained
by a particular covariate, one can compare the relative fit of the
traditional HM and the model with the effect of the covariate
included (Figures 1A,E). Furthermore, one can evaluate whether
the match between the observed and the expected correlations
between RA and RT improves for the extended model and
whether after conditioning on the added covariates CD is present
in the extended model (e.g., using posterior predictive checks
similar to Bolsinova and Tijmstra, 2016).
For the purpose of extending the HM to explain CD,
various relevant covariates can be considered, which should be
picked to test hypotheses about the suspected source(s) of CD.
Person covariates (e.g., school type or an external measure of
reading ability) can be included in the model to test whether
CD is due to DIF across subgroups and whether unmodelled
multidimensionality leads to negative CD. Item covariates (e.g.,
whether verbal comprehension is required on a mathematics
item) can also be used to test whether CD is due to an unmodeled
ability dimension. Similarly, including item position (e.g., 1 for
items at the end of the test and 0 otherwise) as a covariate can
be used for considering whether differential decrease of response
caution added to the model as an additional latent variable is a
source of positive CD. Response covariates, such as pupil dilation
as a measure of concentration, can be used to test whether
negative CD is due to within-person variation of cognitive
capacity.Moreover, patterns of eyemovements and brain activity,
or data from respondents’ verbal protocols (i.e., respondents are
asked in one way or another about how they solved an item) can
be included as response covariates for determining whether CD
is due to heterogeneity in the RPs.
Regardless of which specific covariates are considered, a
researcher using such an extended HM will have to decide
whether to approach these covariates in an exploratory way, or to
formulate explicit hypotheses about the direction of their effect
that can be tested. While providing the technical details of these
different possible modeling approaches goes beyond the scope of
this Perspectives paper, we hope that these suggestions provide
the reader with an indication of the modeling steps that can be
taken to move toward explanatory models for CD.
With the variety of plausible phenomena that may give rise
to CD, carefully considering its presence and attempting to
understand and model it is important both for the validity of
the statistical inferences made based on the responses and for the
study of the processes that gave rise to those responses. As our
overview of the range of phenomena potentially leading to CD
indicates, determining and understanding the exact source(s) of
CD likely requires more information than is available from just
RA and RT.We argue that considering relevant person, item, and
response covariates is a way of moving from descriptive models
in which CD is accounted for in a statistical way to explanatory
models aimed at obtaining a better understanding of the response
phenomena.
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